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CLASSIFYING ERRONEOUS GAMBLING-RELATED BELIEFS 
 
Abstract 
Erroneous gambling-related beliefs (EGRBs) can be defined as beliefs that imply a 
failure to recognise how commercial gambling activities are designed to generate a 
guaranteed loss to players. In theorising about how EGRBs develop, previous reviews 
have proposed that EGRBs are extensions of decision-making heuristics and associated 
biases. We propose an alternative generative mechanism: one in which gambling games 
make substantial wins seem possible through problem-solving and eventual correct 
strategic action. EGRBs are then beliefs in the possibility of correct strategic action 
(illusion of control) that develop as players trial candidate strategies – strategies selected 
based on various broader beliefs. We further propose that EGRBs can be classified 
based on what is theorised in cognitive science about categories of general human 
beliefs about the world. For example, it has been theorised that human beliefs about 
supernatural forces and randomness have certain similarities across cultures, and so we 
propose that there exists a category of supernatural EGRBs, as well as a category of 
EGRBs based on broader beliefs about the nature of randomness. We review evidence 
for this classification scheme and discuss how it can be applied in researching and 
treating gambling disorder.  
Keywords 
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Commercial gambling activities, such as slot machine gambling, Blackjack, 
and sports-betting, are designed to generate random or highly uncertain outcomes with a 
guaranteed long-term loss for the player. The player’s loss translates into a profit for the 
gambling provider – or “the house”. Thoughts and verbal statements implying a 
misunderstanding of the systems in place for creating this profit can be termed 
erroneous gambling-related beliefs (EGRBs; Ladouceur et al., 2001). This paper 
presents a novel explanation for how EGRBs develop, describes a classification scheme 
for EGRBs that follows from the explanation, and discusses applications of the 
classification scheme in researching and treating gambling disorder. Existing 
explanations of EGRBs and associated classification schemes are premised on the idea 
that EGRBs map onto biases that stem from decision-making short-cuts (or 
“heuristics”), which provide fast, but not always accurate, solutions in gambling 
environments and beyond (Fortune & Goodie, 2012; Griffiths, 1994; Leonard, 
Williams, & Vokey, 2015; Toneatto, 1999; Toneatto et al., 1997; Wagenaar, 1988). The 
heuristics-and-biases conceptualisation of human decision-making has been challenged 
in the past two decades (Chase, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 1998; Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996; 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Oaksford & Chater, 2001; Osman, 2004). We propose 
instead that EGRBs are products of a problem-solving process – contemplated solutions 
to the problem of how to beat the house, generated based on background beliefs about 
the properties of supernatural forces, random sequences and business dynamics. In our 
view, classifying EGRBs involves identifying the general background-belief domain to 
which they relate. 
We begin, in Section 1, by describing EGRBs in different kinds of gambling 
activities and across 40 studies. A substantial proportion of contributing studies were 
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concerned with the illusion of control – a phenomenon that, we argue, can be considered 
an umbrella term for EGRBs. In Section 2, we present an explanation of EGRBs 
grounded in the notion of problem-solving informed by background beliefs. The section 
goes on to classify various EGRBs based on what is currently known in cognitive 
science about categories of background beliefs.  Emerging psychometric evidence for 
the classification scheme is discussed, as are the scheme’s implications for measuring 
EGRBs. Given that treatment programs for gambling disorder are often targeted at 
correcting EGRBs even though EGRBs are not mentioned in diagnostic criteria for 
gambling disorder, we dedicate Section 3 to discussing the implications of our 
classification scheme for researching and treating gambling disorder. Factors identified 
as contributing to the development of gambling disorder in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 
2013) include intermittent wins, trait impulsivity, and mood disorders that motivate 
persistent gambling as an escape route. We discuss the potential role of a theory-based 
EGRB classification scheme in research streams on each of these factors. With respect 
to the treatment of gambling disorder, one of our key arguments is that our scheme’s 
implications for measuring EGRBs are points to consider in improving brief 
interventions, in which clients’ levels of endorsement of various EGRBs are explicitly 
compared to average levels reported by the general population. 
1 EGRBs across gambling activities: definition and 
examples 
EGRBs can be defined as beliefs that imply a failure to recognise the 
mechanisms in place for guaranteeing a negative long-term return-to-player in 
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commercial gambling activities. In this section, we flesh out this definition by 
describing how the negative winning expectancy is assured in different commercial 
gambling activities. We then present a comprehensive tabular summary of EGRBs 
documented since the 1960s across 40 studies. We also discuss the close parallels 
between EGRBs and the illusion of control – the phenomenon studied in over a quarter 
of the reviewed studies. 
Mechanisms for guaranteeing negative long-term winning expectancies in 
gambling: overlooked in EGRBs 
Like all gambling activities, commercial gambling involves betting money on 
the possibility of receiving a payout larger than the bet amount in the event of a highly 
uncertain outcome. Often, the game outcome is determined by a random outcome 
generator (ROG): namely, a lottery drawing, a card deck, a die, a roulette wheel, or a 
computer. The outcomes of ROGs are not predictable based on past outcomes or any 
other variable (e.g., Nickerson, 2002). An alternative to betting on the outcomes of an 
ROG is to bet on uncertain future events that depend on a very large number of 
variables, including the competitors’ form, playing conditions, and many possible 
real-time match events (e.g., Reith, 2002). Gambling, therefore, involves both 
ROG-based games (i.e., slot machine gambling, roulette, Blackjack, Craps, poker, 
lotteries, and Bingo), also known as “gaming”, and non-ROG-based games (i.e., betting 
on sports and animal racing), also known as “wagering” (Reith, 2002). 
The negative return-to-player in both types of commercial gambling activities 
translates into a positive return (i.e., profit) for the house. To guarantee profit, the house 
offers payout amounts that are always less than the amount that would be fair given the 
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probability of the staked-on outcome (Dow Schüll, 2014). In gaming, the outcome 
probabilities can be calculated based on game rules, and payout amounts for any 
possible bet can be fixed based on those calculations (although the system works 
differently in poker ​1​). In gambling activities not based on an ROG – that is, in wagering 
on sports and animal racing – the probability of any particular outcome depends on a 
large number of variables, so, in most cases, the house determines outcome probabilities 
and payout rates using complex algorithms that combine data from extensive records of 
relevant variables. An exception is pari-mutuel betting, in which the house takes a 
proportion of the total amount bet by the pool of players before the close of betting 
(e.g., Griffith, 1949). A very small percentage of players can maintain a positive 
winning expectancy in this context, dedicating themselves fulltime to record-keeping 
and algorithm development (Walker, 1992, p. 20). 
EGRBs can be defined as beliefs implying that it is possible to not be subject to 
the negative winning expectancy in commercial gambling; that is, to consistently beat 
the house. Ladouceur and colleagues (2001) define EGRBs as beliefs in winning “even 
in the face of negative odds” (p. 774).  
Notably, it is not erroneous to believe that the negative winning expectancy can 
in theory ​be overturned in pari-mutuel sports- and race-betting (as well as poker; see 
Endnote 1). Moreover, it is not erroneous to believe that the negative winning 
expectancy can be ​minimised ​in many other gambling activities, including ROG-based 
games with complex rules – rules that some players become better than others in 
learning and applying (Bjerg, 2010; Dow Schüll, 2014). Similarly, in non-pari-mutuel 
sports- and race-betting, some players develop prediction algorithms that are more 
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effective than algorithms developed by other players but inferior to those maintained by 
the house.  
EGRBs documented across a range of studies 
Table 1 describes EGRBs documented across 40 studies, using a range of 
methodologies: interviews, observation of real-world gambling behaviour, analysis of 
quantitative trends in real-world gambling behaviour, experimental research, and 
research using surveys of EGRBs (for a review of available EGRB surveys, see Goodie 
& Fortune, 2013 and Leonard, Williams, & Vokey, 2015). Broadly speaking, the table 
suggests that people might expect to beat the house through strategies for playing (e.g., 
Beliefs 1-3, 10-11) or through strategies for being a “good” person or performing the 
correct rituals so as to be rewarded with big wins by higher (supernatural) powers (e.g., 
Beliefs 4-9, 12-13). Notably, experiments provide objective evidence of strategy-use but 
are not always conclusive as to whether the evident strategies are intended to 
systematically beat the house or simply to minimise the house profit margin. Intentions 
can be investigated more directly through interviews and surveys.  
The table also shows that, with the exception of Keren and Wagenaar’s (1985) 
study of blackjack players (Beliefs 3, 7 and 8), Ohtsuka and Chan’s (2010) study of 
mahjong players (Belief 6), and Lam’s (2007) study of baccarat players (Belief 13), 
EGRBs in games where losses can be minimised through skill have lacked research 
attention. Surveys of EGRBs have been published as surveys applicable to all kinds of 
gambling activities, but their lack of recognition of the role of strategies in 
loss-minimisation in many games has been criticised (Leonard, Williams, & Vokey, 
2015). 
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EGRBs and the illusion of control 
The dozen-or-so studies documenting Belief 14 are demonstrations of a 
phenomenon that has come to be widely known as the “illusion of control”, and Beliefs 
20 and 21 are survey statements labelled as tapping into the illusion. Uncovered in one 
of the studies cited in the footnotes to Table 1 (Langer, 1975), the illusion of control can 
be defined as the expectation that certain personal actions can be taken to increase the 
probability of ending a game of pure chance with a net win. Langer (1975) found that 
participants who had selected their own lottery ticket named a higher re-sale price for 
their tickets than participants who had been assigned a randomly drawn ticket. Langer 
concluded from this that some participants (erroneously) believed that there was a 
positive causal relationship between their strategic actions in choosing a ticket and the 
probability of winning the lottery.  
While the illusion of control has predominantly been studied in the context of 
lotteries, roulette and slot-machine gambling, references have been made to the illusion 
of control over health (Langer 1983), investments (De Carolis & Saparito 2006) and 
gambling activities in which it is possible to reduce the house profit margin (e.g., Keren 
& Wagenaar 1985). However, all these activities involve a degree of skill – a 
contingency between actions and outcomes – so attempting to strategise during these 
activities does not necessarily constitute an illusion or error. At the same time, since 
commercial gambling activities are losing games, the definition of the illusion of control 
is often broadened to include the error of assuming that optimal strategising can 
generate more than mere loss minimisation in commercial gambling. In effect, the 
illusion of control is often used as an umbrella term for EGRBs. Distinctions have been 
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made between “primary” and “secondary” illusions of control (e.g., Clark, 2010; Ejova, 
Delfabbro, & Navarro, 2015; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982), and in the next 
section, we describe the theoretical basis for our classification of EGRBs, we make a 
similar broad distinction between “natural” and “supernatural” EGRBs. Our theory 
about the conceptual origins of primary/natural and secondary/supernatural EGRBs 
might be among the explanations for the illusion of control (see Ejova, in press), but 
Langer originally suggested that the illusion is a product of a universal “need for 
control” that protects psychological wellbeing. In the next section, we propose that such 
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Table 1. EGRBs documented across 40 studies.  
Interviews Observations and quantitative 
analyses of real-world gambling 
Experiments 
1.​  In a focus group study, slot-machine 
players reporting gambling-related 
problems expressed the belief that 
slot-machine operators reprogram slot 
machines to pay out less on popular days 
for gambling, such as pension days 
(Livingstone, Wooley, & Borrell, 2006; 
see also Hahmann, 2017, p.149 “Hot 
Machines”). 
 
10. ​An analysis of number choices in two 
United States lotteries indicated that 
numbers were less likely to be chosen if 
they had been recently drawn out 
(Clotfelter & Cook, 1993; Terrell, 1994; 
see also Fong, So & Law, 2016, for a 
similar finding with options analogous to 
roulette’s “red” and “black” in the Chinese 
dice game, Cussec). 
 
14. ​In lotteries*, roulette^, slot machine 
gambling​~​ and bingo​#​, the researchers 
listed in the table notes below 
demonstrated that participants in versions 
of the game with more response options 
(e.g., a stoppage lever or known jackpot 
combination on a slot machine) were 
characterised by higher ratings of personal 
control, ratings of confidence in winning, 
bet amounts or number of trials played. 
Since chances of winning were visibly and 
objectively unaffected by the number of 
available response options, the results 
suggest that participants interpreted the 
options as advantageous based on a belief 
that it is possible to take action to 
influence pure-chance outcomes. 
 
2.​ The slot-machine players from 
Livingstone et al.’s study above displayed 
a preference for a minimum-bet, 
maximum-lines strategy in expectation 
that one of the lines would be likely to 
show the winning outcome as the playing 
session progressed (Livingstone, Wooley, 
& Borrell, 2006; see also Ohtsuka, 2013). 
 
11. ​In a group of craps players joined by 
an observing sociologist, it was common 
for players to throw dice harder when they 
needed higher numbers (Henslin, 1967).  
 
15. ​Ayton and Fischer (2004) observed a 
tendency to predict a colour (red or blue) 
in a simplified roulette game less and less, 
the longer the colour appeared 
consecutively in immediately preceding 
trials (see also Boynton, 2003, Experiment 
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3.​ Blackjack players at a casino reported a 
preference for playing on two boxes, as 
they expected poor outcomes on one to be 
counterbalanced by favourable outcomes 
on the other (Keren & Wagenaar, 1985; 
see also Baboushkin et al., 2001). 
 
12. ​A Canadian survey-based research 
programme identified a relationship 
between gambling urge and perceived 
personal deprivation, controlling for 
relevant confounds (Callan, Ellard, Shead 




4.​ “When I first got started, I went a whole 
year without winning. Then I changed my 
attitude. I give 10 percent of my winnings 
to the church. When I win, I put it in an 
envelope. If you do that, you'll get ahead” 
(from an interview with a bingo player; 
King (1990) p. 53; see also Henslin, 1967) 
 
13. ​In the study of craps players described 
above, players who happened to 
accidentally drop the dice rubbed them 
against something before proceeding 
(Henslin, 1967; see also Lam, 2007, for a 
description of rituals used by casino 
baccarat players in Macau). 
 
16. ​In one of a series of experiments by 
Wohl and Enzle (2009, Experiment 3), 
participants were more likely to delegate 
the drawing out of a lottery ticket to a 
confederate after she described her 
continued gambling success following a 
visit to a museum, during which she was 
able to touch a widely-known lucky 
sporting object. This finding suggests that 
people believe luck to be carried by 
objects, which can be ritualistically 
touched to obtain good luck. 
5.​ Vietnamese interviewees in an 
Australian casino expressed the belief that 
gambling losses are a consequence of bad 
acts committed in the past, acts that can be 
redeemed through future good acts 
(Ohtsuka & Ohtsuka, 2010).  
 
 17.  ​In a different set of experiments by 
Wohl and Enzle (2002) participants in a 
roulettle-like game (wheel-of-fortune) 
engaged in higher levels of ritualised 
behaviour following their own wheel spins 
(as compared to the experimenter’s; 
Experiment 2). Participants also rated their 
chances of winning as higher when they 
could be in physical or visual contact with 
an object resembling the ball-bearing 
during spins (Experiment 3). Together, the 
findings suggest that some people seek to 
exert magical influence on chance 
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6.​ Players of casino Mahjong – a dice-like 
game – in Macau described a number of 
widely-performed rituals, including not 
playing immediately after a haircut and 
not letting anyone touch their shoulder 
during the game (Ohtsuka & Chan, 2010).  
 
 18. ​Xu, Zwick and Schwarz (2012) found 
that participants required to wash their 
hands after recalling (Experiment 1) or 
experiencing (Experiment 2) an episode of 
bad luck (in Experiment 2, the episode 
consisted of two unsuccessful gambling 
outcomes in a row) were more 
risk-seeking than participants not required 
to wash their hands. Meanwhile, after 
recalls or experiences of episodes of good 
luck (in Experiment 2, the episode 
consisted of two consecutive gambling 
wins), washing hands had the opposite 
effect. The findings are evidence of a 
belief in the possibility of desirable 
cleansing from bad luck and undesirable 
cleansing from good luck. 
 
7.​ “[Lucky ink dabbers in bingo] lose their 
thing you know… the colors just fade 
away… the colors just lose their appeal to 
me. I need something new, a different 
color to bring me luck.” (King, 1990, p. 
56; see also Keren & Wagenaar, 1985, p. 
152  for a discussion of perceived “waves” 
of luck) 
 
 19. ​ In further experiments by Wohl and 
Enzle (2009, Experiments 1 and 2), 
participants were more likely to delegate a 
roulette spin to a confederate when, in 
casual conversation prior to the spin, the 
confederate described himself as “lucky” 
on account of having enjoyed consistent 
gambling success. This finding suggests 
that people also believe that luck can be 
carried by people. 
8.​ Blackjack players reported believing 
that a bad flow of cards could be reversed 
by betting in an unusual way or simply 
changing tables. The players clarified that 
this belief was, in turn, informed by the 
belief that card flow is determined by luck 
or “fate”, an omniscient force which 
assumes that players maintain an optimal 
strategy. Breaking the flow, therefore, 
requires doing something out of the 





9.​ “I don't believe in lucky seats, but some 
people do… They look around and see… 
which table has a lot of winners. Then the 
next week they try and sit with those 
players. They figure the luck will rub off 
on them.” (King, 1990, p. 56) 
 
  
Notes: *Lotteries: Langer (1975, Experiments 2 and 3); Nichols, Stich, Leslie and Klein (1996); Wortman (1975),  
^Roulette: Dixon (2000); Friedland, Kienan and Regev, 1992; Tobias-Webb et al., 2016; Wohl and Enzle 
(2002, Experiment 1);  
~ ​Slot machines: Clark et al., 2009; Dixon et al. (2017); Ladouceur and Sevigny (2005); Rockloff et al. 
(2015, Chapter 4, Experiment 2);  
#​Bingo: Gilovich and Douglas (1986) 
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2 The problem-solving theory of EGRBs and ensuing 
classification 
After proposing that, at least for some, gambling involves problem-solving 
informed by background beliefs – or theories – about the world, we discuss how the 
EGRBs described in Section 1 can be classified into those generated based on human 
theories of supernatural forces, those generated based on human concepts of 
randomness, those generated based on concepts of randomness and theories of 
supernatural forces simultaneously, and those generated based on human theories of 
natural phenomena other than randomness. We then briefly discuss how 
problem-solving – the generative mechanism for EGRBs – acquires some unique 
properties when influenced by universally fallacious concepts of randomness. After 
describing emerging psychometric evidence for our classification scheme – that is, 
evidence from surveys factor-analysed to identify underlying categories of EGRBs --we 
conclude with a discussion of the implications of our scheme for measuring EGRBs. 
Gambling as problem-solving based on background beliefs 
Alongside visible opportunities for financial gain, gambling activities feature 
visible action alternatives, including buttons on slot machines, the grid of possible bets 
in roulette, and a myriad of betting options in sports- and race-betting. Because the 
action alternatives and potential monetary prize are among the only visible design 
features of gambling environments, at least some players are likely to conclude that the 
two features might be causally connected. Moreover, gambling activities are widely 
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labelled “games”, which, in other domains, such as sports and multi-player card games, 
involve a causal connection between available actions and the prize on offer.  
We propose that, because gambling activities are designed to suggest a potential 
causal connection between actions and outcomes, and, possibly, because human 
psychological wellbeing might depend on overestimating the extent to which actions 
might be effective in obtaining desired outcomes (Cummins & Nistico, 2002; Langer, 
1975; Leotti, Iyengar & Ochsner, 2010; Weinstein, 1980), some players proceed to 
approach gambling as a problem-solving exercise. Problem-solving consists of 
physically trialling or mentally simulating actions to determine whether they achieve the 
goal state or bring the goal state closer (e.g., Anderson, 1993). For example, a person 
might contemplate three actions for bringing about substantial wins through 
slot-machine gambling: (1) selecting machines that have not produced a win for some 
time, (2) not playing on popular days for gambling to avoid being tricked by venue 
owners, and (3) taking a lucky charm to the venue. In a search through physical trial, the 
person might perform the first action for some number of sessions. Should he find that 
the amount of money he has available is consistently shrinking rather than growing, he 
is likely to switch to performing one of the other two contemplated actions, and to 
mentally simulating other possible actions. Upon running out of action alternatives to 
trial, the person would cease pursuing the goal of gambling wins; that is, he would give 
up on the problem. This would mean ending the gambling session or continuing without 
an action plan, driven by social or emotional reasons. People playing just to stay longer 
at the venue – in the “gambling zone” – instead of facing problems at home (Dow 
Schüll, 2014) might be among those playing for purely emotional reasons, for example. 
14 
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Similarly, regular sports betting can be motivated purely by the desire to join friends at 
the pub or racetrack (Walker, 1992, p. 18). 
In what constituted a preliminary demonstration of reliance on problem-solving 
during gambling, Ejova, Navarro and Delfabbro (2013) manipulated the trajectory (i.e., 
“slope”) of wins in a laboratory gambling task. That is, participants experienced wins 
primarily at the beginning of the session, primarily at the end, or spread evenly 
throughout. Reports of strategy effectiveness were found to be higher in the late-wins 
condition compared to the early-wins condition. This suggests that those experiencing 
late wins engaged in some trial-and-error learning – a component of problem-solving. 
Boynton (2003, Experiment 2) also observed a win-stay approach among participants 
predicting the next outcome among two possible outcomes known to be randomly 
generated. Thus, in a situation where “wins” were correct predictions, participants 
continued trialling an option that had worked in the past, despite knowing that outcomes 
were independent of each other. 
We can further speculate that near-wins (instances of narrowly missed wins; for 
example due to one reel being out of line on a slot machine) are likely to speed up the 
process of iterating through a set of contemplated actions by eliciting regret and 
subsequent upward counterfactual thinking – mental simulation to imagine how a 
different detail or action might have led to a better outcome (Coricelli, Dolan & Sirigu, 
2007; Epstude & Roese, 2008). Meanwhile, an optimistic personality is likely to be 
associated with slowed iteration through possible strategies, due, in part, to less efficient 
learning from outcomes that were worse than expected. Lefebvre and colleagues (2017) 
observed evidence of learning with an optimism bias in a chance-driven 
15 
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problem-solving task. Participants were instructed to maximise monetary rewards by 
selecting, from two symbols on the screen, the stimulus associated with a monetary 
reward. The alternatives were equally likely to generate rewards, but 50 percent of 
participants distinctly preferred one of the options to an extent resembling a computer 
simulation engaged in learning with an optimism bias. Functional magnetic resonance 
imaging conducted during the task suggested that participants who displayed this 
optimistic learning pattern differed from the remainder of participants specifically in 
terms of how rewards were encoded in the neural network known to be involved in 
reward processing (see also Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004). 
Our overall proposal that gambling can involve iterating through strategic 
actions has implications for the classification of EGRBs because, in light of our earlier 
definition of EGRBs as beliefs that there is potential to beat the house, any strategic 
action conceived of during the iterative process represents an EGRB. A further highly 
relevant consideration in classifying EGRBs under our problem-solving framework is 
that the content and quantity of actions contemplated during problem-solving have been 
found to be influenced by the individual’s background beliefs. Chi, Feltovich, and 
Glaser (1981) compared trained physicists and novices on how they categorised a set of 
physics problems. Physicists created a small number of categories based on the 
Newtonian Laws required for solving the problems, whereas novices created a large 
number of categories on the basis of the problems’ wording. Similarly, in a laboratory 
gambling task described to participants as a slot-machine-like task, Ejova and 
colleagues (2013) found that post-game beliefs about the effectiveness of various 
16 
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strategies were more strongly held by people who had, in a pre-game survey, expressed 
stronger beliefs in the controllability of slot machine outcomes. 
A third relevant consideration with respect to classifying EGRBs is that 
background beliefs have been more precisely defined in cognitive science as internally 
represented theories of the world that vary in generality (Murphy & Medin, 1985; 
Tenenbaum, Griffiths & Niyogi, 2007; Thagard, 1992; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). 
Effectively, under this view, all but the most general theories are “beliefs” that emerge 
from more general theories, and all but the most situation-specific beliefs are “theories” 
capable of generating more specific theories or beliefs. Thus, for example, the EGRB 
that venue managers reprogram slot machines to provide a lower return on popular days 
for gambling, such as pension days – Belief 1 in Table 1 – is likely to be rooted in one 
of the most general theories available to humans: the ​theory of mind​ (e.g., Wellman & 
Gelman, 1992). According to the theory of mind, all human beings, including oneself, 
act according to certain beliefs and desires (or goals), which are in turn influenced by 
relevant states of the world. In business settings, a common goal is to maximize profit, 
taking into account current states of the world, which include business cycles. This 
application of the theory of mind to defining business decision-making is, in itself, a 
theory; a theory capable of generating the even more situation-specific theory that the 
owners of commercial gambling venues would wish to make changes to the structure of 
games in response to the business cycle. In the next section, we argue that it is possible 
to classify EGRBs based on what the cognitive science literature hypothesises about the 
content of higher-level generative theories relevant to gambling. 
17 
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Classification of EGRBs based on cognitive-scientific hypotheses about the content 
of relevant background beliefs 
EGRBs generated by concepts of the supernatural. ​Theories in the cognitive 
science of religion point to a general belief structure that generates all variants of 
religious belief (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Boyer 2001; Kirkpatrick, 1999), including 
beliefs about less human-like supernatural agents such as fate and karma (Wilson, 
Bulbulia & Sibley, 2013). The structure consists of beliefs in the existence of 
supernatural agents (gods, ghosts, angels, etc.), the power of supernatural agents to avert 
natural calamities (usually for “deserving” individuals), and rituals as a means of 
appealing to supernatural agents. The universality of this belief set has been attributed to 
the fact that it is a by-product of evolved cognitive mechanisms, such as propensity 
towards detecting agents (e.g., predators) given the faintest of clues (e.g., a wind gust) ​2​.  
Among the beliefs that can be generated by this broader belief structure are 
beliefs that outcomes in life – and, by implication, in gambling – can be improved 
through good conduct noticed by supernatural agents, as well as through ritual-based 
appeals to those agents. In Table 1, Beliefs 4, 5 and 12 postulate that gambling wins can 
be “deserved” through good conduct or prior suffering and deprivation. Meanwhile, 
Beliefs 6, 7, 13, 16, 17, 18, 26, 27, 28 and 29 pertain to advantages gained through 
rituals, and Belief 25 – “Sometimes I get spiritual help when gambling” – is a general 
statement that captures a belief in the availability of help from supernatural agents 
without specifying the associated mechanisms. Belief 8 about luck’s all-knowing (i.e., 
supernatural) role in blackjack represents, along with Belief 7 about selecting lucky 
dabbers in bingo, evidence that luck is among the supernatural agents players to which 
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appeal through rituals. A seemingly conflicting documented EGRB – exemplified by 
Beliefs 9, 19 and 30 – is that good luck (significant and enduring success amidst close 
calls in gambling and other contexts; Pritchard & Smith, 2004) is a personal trait, rather 
than an external higher force. This EGRB that good luck is a character trait is, however, 
not incompatible with the notion that good luck is conferred by higher forces on those 
who deserve it, or perhaps on those who share a “lineage” with deserving ancestors 
(Sommer, 2007, p. 275). 
EGRBs generated by a universal concept of randomness, the “gambler’s 
fallacy.”  
Following numerous studies in which participants were required to produce 
“random” sequences, it has been suggested that, universally, humans have a tendency to 
expect that sequences generated by random-number generators are highly unlikely to 
feature overly long runs of any one possible outcome (e.g., eight Heads in a row during 
coin tossing).  This expectation is known as the “gambler’s fallacy” and is formally 
defined as the expectation of a dynamically changing negative recency in random 
outcomes; that is, an expectation that the probability of an alternation in random 
outcomes increases with each repetition  (for reviews, see Nickerson, 2002, and 
Oskarsson, Van Boven, Hastie & McClelland, 2009).  
Various explanations for the gambler’s fallacy have been advanced (see 
reviews cited earlier), and a number of recent explanations (Hahn & Warren, 2009; 
Rabin, 2002; Rapoport & Budescu, 1997) allow for the possibility that the gambler’s 
fallacy stems from a general belief about the nature of randomness – a theory available 
to problem-solvers encountering outcomes they believe to be random. At first glance, 
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having a theory of randomness appears to make no logical sense, since, by definition, 
sequences of random outcomes are “incompressible” – infinitely complex, and not 
describable by rules (Nickerson, 2002, p. 333). However, in board games, gambling and 
systematic random draws (e.g., for tax audits), humans do encounter sequences that are 
likely to be explicitly labelled random (what Nickerson, 2002, p. 335, refers to as 
“products” of randomness). People can form concepts (i.e., theories) of randomness 
based on those encounters. Limitations in working memory and over-inference from 
small samples have been discussed as reasons for why human theories of randomness 
converge on a notion of a dynamically changing negative recency (Hahn & Warren, 
2009; Rapoport & Budescu, 1997). For example, making a case for the role of working 
memory limitations, Hahn and Warren (2009) demonstrated, through simulations, that 
sequences of up to 50 chance-determined outcomes such as coin-tosses have the 
property that, if any series of six consecutive outcomes is selected from the sequence, 
the series is ​least​ likely to consist of uniform runs (e.g., six tails) and perfect 
alternations (e.g., the sequence ​tails-heads-tails-heads-tails-heads​). The property is 
even more pronounced in sequences of 20 outcomes but does not hold in longer 
sequences of 500, or even 100, outcomes. In a typical board game or coin toss sequence, 
people experience random outcomes in sequences of no more than 50. Over the course 
of those 50-outcome-long playing sessions, they are likely to notice structure across 
only five or six outcomes at a time, as that is the capacity of human working memory 
(Miller, 1956). Thus, in attending to fragments of what are already short random 
sequences, people learn (i.e., develop the theory) that randomness is a process that is 
unlikely to generate uniform runs and perfect alternations.  
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Under our classification framework, in a commercial gambling setting, the 
gambler’s fallacy generates EGRBs such as Beliefs 2, 10, 15, 22, 23, and 24 in Table 1. 
Apart from beliefs in the increasing future probability for less recent outcomes (Beliefs 
10, 15, and 22), the generated beliefs include beliefs in the value of consistently betting 
small amounts while waiting for a winning combination, imminent amidst repetitions of 
losing combinations (Belief 2), beliefs in the value of “staying on” a single response 
option (e.g., a particular roulette number) that is bound to become the winning option in 
alternation with other options (Belief 23), and beliefs in the ability to change up 
responses in line with the next ​new ​(rather than repeated) outcome a random number 
generator is going to generate (Belief 24).  
EGRBs generated by theories of the natural world other than the 
gambler’s fallacy.​ The strategy of avoiding slot machines on pension days and other 
days believed to be popular for gambling (Belief 1 in Table 1) is, under our framework, 
an example of a strategic EGRB generated by a theory of the natural world other than a 
theory of randomness. As suggested during our description of gambling as 
problem-solving, this EGRB proceeds from background beliefs about business cycles, 
which, at the broadest level, proceed from a theory of human interaction as per theory of 
mind. Apart from theories of “other minds”, humans have broad theories of physics and 
biology (Dennett, 1987; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). As 
people participate in commercial gambling games or imagine doing so, these general 
theories of mind, physics and biology can generate layers of sub-theories that give rise 
to EGRBs. It is possible that Belief 11 in Table 1 – the belief that harder throws of the 
dice are more likely to produce a higher number – has its origins in a theory of physics. 
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In gambling games where it is possible to minimise the house profit margin, 
strategies based on concepts of the supernatural and the gambler’s fallacy are the only 
strategies that are erroneous irrespective of game context and player skill. In games with 
controllable (albeit always positive) house profit margins, strategies based on natural 
theories other than an erroneous theory of randomness are so context-dependent that it 
is difficult to determine whether they are erroneous based on player reports or 
short-term observation (Bjerg, 2010).  
EGRBs generated by concepts of randomness and concepts of the 
supernatural simultaneously.​ It is possible for the previously described supernatural 
belief structure to combine with beliefs about the natural world in generating EGRBs. 
Indeed, most beliefs in the supernatural are predicated on theories of biology, matter 
and mind, deviating from those beliefs in minor and systematic ways (Atran & 
Norenzayan, 2004; Barrett, 2000). For example, the common ritual of washing one’s 
hands of bad luck (Belief 18; see also Ohtsuka & Chan, 2010) represents only a small 
deviation from washing one’s hands of some physical pollutant. We speculate that the 
EGRB that luck follows a cyclical pattern, appearing periodically and then vanishing, as 
reflected in Belief 7, might likewise follow simultaneously from natural and 
supernatural background beliefs. The “periodicity” aspect of the belief might derive 
from the generalisation of the gambler’s fallacy – a theory about randomness or 
“chance” – to the closely-related concept of “luck”. Luck and chance are closely-related 
in that emotionally significant good chance outcomes are lucky by definition. This is 
because chance outcomes have many close counterfactual alternatives, and lucky 
outcomes are, by definition, emotionally significant successes amidst many 
counterfactual scenarios involving failure (Pritchard & Smith, 2004; see also Ejova, in 
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press, for a discussion of how the use of random-number-generators in fortune-telling 
might have lead to the formation of notions about cyclical luck).​ ​The second component 
of the EGRB in cyclical luck – the belief that luck is an agent capable of deciding when 
to “appear” – is consistent with the finding that luck is often conceived of as a 
supernatural being, responsive to rituals and states of the world.  
EGRBs not yet classified under our framework – Beliefs 14, 20 and 21 in 
Table 1 – were uncovered in research on the illusion of control and refer generally to 
“strategies for playing”. In light of their generality, these beliefs could belong to any of 
the belief categories in our classification scheme: beliefs generated based on theories of 
supernatural forces, concepts of randomness, concepts of randomness and theories of 
supernatural forces simultaneously, and theories of natural phenomena other than 
randomness. 
Unique characteristics of problem-solving informed by the gambler’s fallacy 
In proposing that many of the EGRBs documented in the literature develop 
through problem-solving, which involves an iterative search for an action capable of 
supplying a sizeable win, we imply that participants in games of chance should 
eventually learn that there is no action available for increasing win probability above the 
chance-determined level. However, we additionally propose that participants in games 
of chance bring to the search for effective actions a concept of randomness or cyclical 
luck according to which a losing streak on a particular line on a slot machine, on a 
particular number in roulette, or while holding on to a particular lucky charm can signal 
that a win is imminent. In holding this fallacious concept of randomness, participants in 
23 
CLASSIFYING ERRONEOUS GAMBLING-RELATED BELIEFS 
 
games of chance are likely to tolerate longer losing streaks during the problem-solving 
process than they would in any other problem-solving situation.  
Research into how the gambler’s fallacy affects the problem solver’s 
trial-and-error process has begun to be conducted, with early findings suggesting that 
the fallacy is drawn upon (presumably, as a theory) only after errors (Boynton, 2003; 
Mossbridge, Roney & Suziki, 2017). So far, however, studied tasks have featured only 
two response options and explicit instructions that outcomes are randomly generated. In 
such tasks, it is possible to track the gambler’s fallacy, but commitment to a single 
particular response (consistent “trial” of an option) is unlikely to emerge as an 
alternative strategy. 
Psychometric evidence of two broad types of EGRBs: natural and supernatural 
Consistently with our proposal that EGRBs are broadly classifiable as “natural” 
and “supernatural”, numerous studies using exploratory factor analysis have found that 
similarities in responding to groups of items were best described by two underlying 
(“latent”) constructs: a construct relating to items mentioning luck and rituals, and a 
construct relating to items referring to the gambler’s fallacy and other non-supernatural 
phenomena (Ejova, Delfabbro & Navarro, 2015; Steenbergh et al., 2002; Wood & 
Clapham, 2005; see also Leonard, Williams & Vokey, 2015 for a review). Ejova and 
colleagues uncovered the same two-factor structure in participants’ self-reports of 
strategies used in a laboratory slot-machine task (Ejova, Delfabbro & Navarro, 2010). 
It has further been demonstrated that a concept of randomness underpins both 
natural EGRBs relating to the gambler’s fallacy and supernatural EGRBs reflecting a 
notion of cyclical luck. The associated study (a confirmatory factor analysis by Ejova, 
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Delfabbro and Navarro, 2015) sought to find the optimal model to account for 
relationships between six scale scores, reflecting endorsement of (1) gambling strategies 
generally, (2) gambling strategies based on the gambler’s fallacy, (3) the value of 
persistent play, (4) the cyclical nature of luck, (5) supernatural agents such as luck and 
god, and (6) gambling rituals.  Good model fit was obtained for a factor structure in 
which Scales 1 to 3 loaded on a latent variable reflecting “natural strategies and 
concepts of randomness,” while Scales 5 and 6 loaded on a latent variable reflecting 
“supernatural strategies.”  Critically also, Scale 4 – belief in the cyclical nature of luck – 
loaded on both latent variables, suggesting that concepts of randomness might inform 
supernatural beliefs in the cyclical nature of luck. 
Implications for measuring EGRBs 
Our conceptualisation of EGRBs points to two main sources of ambiguity in 
EGRB surveys that should be taken into account when selecting an EGRB survey, 
designing a survey, or developing objective (i.e., behavioural) measures of EGRBs. 
Firstly, we attribute EGRBs to problem-solving based, at the most general level, on 
beliefs about natural or supernatural phenomena, and it follows that survey statements 
referring to gambling “strategies” or “systems” without further clarification are 
ambiguous as to whether they refer to natural or supernatural strategies. A person 
endorsing a statement such as “Show me a gambler with a well-planned system and I’ll 
show you a winner” (Belief 21 in Table 1) could theoretically believe in only natural or 
only supernatural systems for winning. Notably, exploratory factor analyses of EGRB 
surveys suggest that, in practice, people tend to conceive of strategies as manipulations 
of physical rather than supernatural phenomena. Statements mentioning strategies have 
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been consistently found to load on a factor separate from statements referring to 
supernatural forces (Ejova, Delfabbro & Navarro, 2015; Steenbergh et al., 2002; Wood 
& Clapham, 2005). 
As hinted in the discussion of EGRBs generated by concepts of randomness 
and concepts of the supernatural simultaneously, a second source of ambiguity in EGRB 
surveys is that “luck” and “chance” are closely-related concepts that are considered 
synonymous by some people (Ohtsuka & Ohtsuka, 2010). In a survey enquiring about 
agreement with statements reflecting various EGRBs, people who equate luck and 
chance would endorse strategies reflecting the gambler’s fallacy to the same degree that 
they would endorse strategies proceeding from the notion that luck is cyclical. In such 
cases, it would be impossible to detect which of the two EGRBs is actually endorsed 
without including a survey item such as “Luck is nothing more than random chance” 
(Darke & Freedman, 1997). Notably, progress has been made in developing objective 
measures of individual differences in endorsement of the gambler’s fallacy (Delfabbro 
& Winefield, 1999; Gökaydin & Ejova, 2017; Gökaydin, Navarro, Ma-Wyatt & Perfors, 
2016; Leonard, Williams, & Vokey, 2015; Ryterska et al., 2014). Objective measures 
should, nevertheless, be administered alongside survey items relating to beliefs in 
cyclical luck and the equivalence of luck and chance to account for any confounding 
effects of supernatural belief in cyclical luck.  
A measurement implication of the definition of EGRBs – independently of the 
proposed classification scheme – is that survey and interview reports of wining 
expectations due to the application of some natural strategy are not necessarily 
erroneous for most gambling types, unless winning is clarified as referring to the 
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elimination of the house edge. Survey and interview questions need to be specific about 
the gambling activity in question and the definition of winning (e.g., as per Ejova, 
Delfabbro, & Navarro, 2015, Leonard, Williams, & Vokey, 2015). 
3 Implications for researching and treating gambling 
disorder  
Gambling disorder, characterised by craving, withdrawal, and financial 
difficulties in relation to gambling (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), affects 1 
to 2 percent of those who gamble (Shaffer, Hall & Vander Bilt., 1999; Wardle et al,, 
2011) and is often treated using cognitive-behavioural therapy, a central aim of which is 
to challenge EGRBs (Rash & Petry, 2014). At the same time, EGRBs have not featured 
prominently in explanations of how gambling disorder develops, most likely because 
EGRBs are generally theorised to arise out of universal decision-making processes 
while gambling disorder develops in only a small minority of people (Clark, 2010). The 
development of gambling disorder is, instead, typically attributed to one or more of the 
following processes (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Blaszczynski & Nower, 
2002): (1) difficulties with “unlearning” after learning from intermittent rewards during 
gambling sessions, (2) excessive risk-taking spurred by trait impulsivity, which is likely 
to be particularly pronounced in people with personality disorders or ADHD, and (3) 
persistent (or, as Dow Schüll (2014) described it, “zoned-out”) gambling to escape 
extreme mood states resulting from anxiety or depression. In this section, we discuss 
how EGRBs, as classified under the problem-solving framework, might combine with 
reinforcement learning effects, impulsivity, and psychiatric conditions in supporting the 
27 
CLASSIFYING ERRONEOUS GAMBLING-RELATED BELIEFS 
 
development of gambling disorder. In a final sub-section, we consider the implications 
of our classification framework for cognitive behavioural therapy for gambling disorder. 
EGRBs, intermittent reinforcement and gambling disorder 
An early explanation for persistent gambling amid losses drew on the classic 
observation that animals who learned behaviours based on unpredictable rewards – that 
is, based on “intermittent” or “partial” reinforcement – were slower to abandon those 
behaviours once all reinforcement ceased (i.e., during “extinction”). It was suggested 
that gambling behaviours are similarly learned with only partial reinforcement (Skinner, 
1953). More recently, Redish and colleagues (2009) developed an explanation of why 
persistent gambling reaches pathological levels in only a small percentage of those who 
engage in learning with partial reinforcement during gambling. The explanation was 
based on a study in which simulated learners could select, from 10 possible actions, a 
single action that was partially reinforced but, as in gambling, costly to perform, to the 
extent that the long-term winning expectancy was negative. After 250 choices, the 
learner experienced 100 trials during which the reinforced but unprofitable action 
suddenly attracted reinforcement at a higher rate and became profitable. In a subsequent 
250 trials with the original (unprofitable) reinforcement conditions, Redish found that 
the probability of choosing the unprofitable action was particularly high among learners 
who had won more in total during the winning streak. Our explanation of EGRBs 
suggests that learners in gambling settings often possess the gambler’s fallacy, so one 
direction we see for extending Redish et al.’s research programme involves 
incorporating the gambler’s fallacy as an additional information processing constraint 
for the simulated learner. Effectively, the learner could be programmed to associate a 
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run of non-reinforcements on an action with higher probability of reinforcement for that 
action. It should then be possible to examine the extent to which large wins remain a 
chief risk factor for persistent gambling and larger losses in these more realistic 
learners.  
EGRBs, impulsive decision-making and gambling disorder 
Impulsivity can be defined as a trait that results in “decreased sensitivity to 
negative consequences of behaviour, rapid unplanned reactions to stimuli before 
complete processing of information, and lack of regard for long-term consequences” 
(Moeller et al., 2001, p. 1784). While many self-report-based and behavioural measures 
of impulsivity have been developed, there is substantial lack of agreement as to how the 
measures cluster together in expressing what are likely to be multiple components of 
impulsivity (Meda et al., 2009). There is, however, accumulating evidence that 
impulsive traits become visible early in human development and have distinctive neural 
correlates, with higher impulsivity being associated with decreased activity in prefrontal 
cortical networks (Whelan et al., 2012). Since impulsivity and its neural correlates have 
been found to be more pronounced among people with various addictive disorders, 
including gambling disorder, a popular view is that gambling disorder is among the 
disorders to which highly impulsive individuals are predisposed from childhood (for 
reviews, see Clark, 2010; Grant, Odlaug & Chamberlain, 2016).  
Our theory of EGRBs contributes to this literature a hypothesis regarding the 
mechanisms by which impulsivity might influence gambling behaviour. There exists 
neuropsychological evidence that, among people without a gambling disorder, higher 
impulsivity is associated with reduced signalling in the ventral striatum and amygdala 
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following near-misses (Shao, Read, Beherens & Rogers, 2013). Since such signalling is 
potentially indicative of reduced regret – a process that leads to counterfactual thinking 
and, with that, under our theory, faster iteration through gambling strategies – it is 
possible that highly impulsive individuals exhibit a distinct problem-solving pattern 
characterised by slower discarding of ineffective strategies. Future research could 
compare people high and low on impulsive traits with respect to rate of decline over 
time in the degree of reported strategy effectiveness in games of chance. The 
neuropsychological correlates of the rate of decline could also be examined. 
EGRBs, psychiatric conditions and gambling disorder 
Cross-sectional and longitudinal research suggests that gambling disorder and 
psychiatric conditions, including personality disorders, anxiety, depression and 
substance use co-occur, and possibly reciprocally cause each other (Abdollahnejad, 
Delfabbro, & Denson, 2014a, 2014b; Afifi et al., 2010; Dussault et al., 2011; Hartmann 
& Blaszczynski, 2016). Whether EGRBs play a mediating or moderating role in any 
potential causal processes is just beginning to be investigated, with Abdollahnejad, 
Delfabbro and Denson (2015) finding that, cross-sectionally, among people fulfilling 
and nearly fulfilling diagnostic criteria for gambling disorder, symptoms of borderline 
personality disorder related to gambling involvement levels both directly and through a 
positive relationship with general delusion-proneness (i.e., preoccupation with beliefs in 
telepathy, one’s likelihood of becoming someone important, etc.). Delusion-proness 
was, in turn, positively related to EGRB endorsement. While requiring longitudinal 
replication, this finding is consistent with the possibility that people with psychiatric 
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disorders might turn to extensive gambling because certain EGRBs are highly consistent 
with other delusions accompanying their psychiatric conditions.  
Further investigations of the relationship between psychiatric conditions, 
delusions, EGRBs and gambling behaviour would benefit from more precise and 
theoretically-grounded measurement of EGRBs – in line with our measurement 
recommendations in Section 2. Improved measurement would allow for conclusions to 
be drawn as to which particular EGRBs are prone to inflation through delusions and 
other symptoms of psychiatric disorders. For example, research employing detailed 
(self-report-based and objective) measures of the gambler’s fallacy as the outcome 
variable could investigate whether being “in the zone” among people with anxiety or 
depression can, in fact, involve waiting for a big win based on the gambler’s fallacy. 
Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) 
Most validated treatment programmes for gambling disorder are based on the 
CBT model, under which programmes assist clients with finding and implementing 
strategies for challenging existing patterns of thought and connected behaviour (Rash & 
Petry, 2014). The end goal is to reduce gambling frequency or abstain from gambling 
completely (e.g., Hodgins, Currie, Currie & Fick, 2009), and almost all programmes 
present active EGRB-correction (through reading and discussions) as a strategic step 
towards this goal (Goodie, Fortune, & Shotwell, 2019). Other strategies typically 
supported by CBT programmes include (1) becoming aware of the negative financial, 
emotional and social consequences of gambling, so as to remind oneself of them when 
the urge to gamble arises, (2) identifying triggers of the urge to gamble and avoiding 
them through increased involvement in family life, social activities and hobbies, (3) 
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learning to harness more positive coping strategies, such as problem-solving, 
assertiveness, and support-seeking, across a variety of domains not limited to gambling, 
and (4) improving financial management skills (Petry, 2005). Our theory of EGRBs has 
implications for the EGRB-correction component of treatment programmes, sessions on 
the consequences of continued gambling, and two recently validated programme 
innovations aimed at reducing client drop-out rates: online delivery and brief 
interventions. 
With respect to EGRB-correction and the recognition of the adverse 
consequences of continued play, our problem-solving theory of EGRBs provides not 
only a belief typology and theoretical framework that can be explicitly discussed with 
clients, but also an explanation of why gambling environments are dangerous, given 
unavoidable (potentially memory-capacity-related) errors in human concepts of 
randomness. Our explanatory framework for EGRBs suggests that the gambler’s fallacy 
is likely to continue generating EGRBs even when strategies based on other background 
beliefs are exhausted. 
With respect to online versions of therapies for gambling, which are gaining 
popularity due to improved client retention rates (Rash & Petry, 2014), our 
problem-solving-related conceptualisation of EGRBs suggests that natural EGRBs not 
deriving from concepts of randomness can be highly game-specific. An implication of 
this is that, beyond accessibility, online therapies have the advantage of being 
customisable to each client’s dominant gambling activity. 
Apart from online delivery, approaches to improving client retention rates 
include brief treatments involving personalised normative feedback (e.g., Cunningham, 
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Hodgins, Toneatto & Murphy, 2012; Larimer et al., 2012). Treatments of this type are 
typically administered in a single session, and involve, first, the measurement of 
gambling frequency, gambling spending and erroneous beliefs; second, a demonstration 
of the extent to which the client’s responses exceed mean levels in the general 
population; and, third, a brief outline of steps to follow in reducing gambling behaviour 
(e.g., by spending more time on other activities). Given the emphasis placed on EGRB 
measurement within this treatment approach, our theory’s implications for measurement 
– discussed in Section 2 – are clinically relevant.  
Conclusion 
This paper introduces a theoretically and empirically supported classification 
scheme for various documented EGRBs based on a number of research directions in 
cognitive science. The relevant research directions concern problem-solving, generative 
knowledge structures (internal theories), the cognitive science of religion, and concepts 
of randomness. While demonstrating a real-world application for these research 
directions, our classification scheme is, most critically, a necessary step in improving 
research designs and measurement instruments for investigating the role of EGRBs in 
the development of gambling disorder. Measurement instruments developed based on 
the theory should, in turn, improve the effectiveness of brief gambling disorder 
treatments centred around EGRB measurement. Indeed, our classification scheme has a 
host of implications for gambling disorder treatment programmes. 
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Notes. 
1. Poker is an ROG-based game in which players compete against each other rather 
than the house. The house makes a profit by charging a proportion of each stake 
(Bjerg, 2010). Poker is, therefore, a commercial gambling activity in which a 
negative return-to-player is not guaranteed, although 80 to 95 percent of online 
players report a negative rate of return (Siler, 2010). 
2. In the cognitive science of religion, the proposal that religion is a by-product of 
evolved cognitive mechanisms is countered by the view that certain features of 
religion were evolutionarily selected for because of their benefits for group fitness 
(e.g., Sosis, 2009). It has, for example, been proposed that costly rituals enhance 
group solidarity (e.g., Bulbulia & Mahoney, 2008). While we believe that the 
“by-product” and “adaptationist” accounts of religion are complementary, we 
focus on the by-product account because it readily explains the existence of 
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